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Abstract It has been much debated whether the Tractarian objects are what Russell 
would have called particulars or whether they include also properties and relations.  This 
paper claims that the debate is misguided: there is no logical category such that 
Wittgenstein intended the reader of the Tractatus to understand his objects either as 
providing examples of or as not providing examples of that category.  This is not to say 
that Wittgenstein set himself against the very idea of a logical category: quite the 
contrary.  However, where Russell presents his logical variety of particulars and the 
various types of universal, and Frege presents his of objects and the various types of 
function, Wittgenstein denies the propriety of such a priori expositions.  Wittgenstein 
envisages a variety of logical types of entity but insists that the nature of these types is 
something to be discovered only through analysis. 
 
 
 
This paper begins with a review of a familiar debate whether Tractarian objects are particulars or 
include also universals.  In the second section I abstract from that debate: a proposal is made rather for 
framing the question of how Tractarian objects are to be placed with the logical ontologies of Frege and 
Russell.  Section three notes some equivalences for that question, so framed, and takes a first look at 
Wittgenstein’s response.  Wittgenstein’s position is then explored more fully in section four.  The 
penultimate section five draws together the conclusions of sections two through four and compares 
them with the debate discussed in section one and also with the positions of certain exegetes not party 
to that debate.  Section six deals with some loose ends and makes a quick connection to Wittgenstein’s 
later philosophy. 
 
 
1. 
 
Hide Ishiguro advises us to keep in mind in reading the Tractatus that Wittgenstein’s expression 
‘object’ (‘Gegenstand’) is “used in the very special way Frege defined” (Ishiguro (2001, 28)).  Given 
Wittgenstein’s knowledge of and great respect for Frege’s works, this suggestion certainly demands 
attention.  It does however face an obvious, prima facie difficulty stemming from the fact that the 
Tractatus does not offer classes of entity of reference contrasting with the Tractarian objects.  Where 
Fregean objects constitute only one of a variety of logical types of entity of reference, the other types 
being constituted by Fregean functions of differing kinds, the Tractatus introduces the word ‘object’ as 
synonymous with ‘entity’ and ‘thing’ (Tractatus 2.01).  What may be referred to the Tractatus calls an 
object.  Given, then, that Tractarian objects do not occupy a place in a Tractarian variety of entities of 
reference comparable to the place occupied by Fregean objects in the Fregean variety of entities of 
reference, how is the suggestion to be made sense of that Tractarian and Fregean objects are of a piece?   
To respond here, one would need to see how Frege pins down his idea of an object other than 
in its opposition within the field of entities of reference to his idea of a function.  The obvious line to 
investigate is Frege’s doctrine that objects are what are referred to by Fregean proper names.  
Alongside Frege’s ontological system of categories of entity sits a logical system of categories of 
linguistic expression.  And these two systems are connected by reference: what a proper name refers to 
is an object; what a function expression of a certain kind refers to is a function of the corresponding 
kind.  With this body of doctrine in view, the prospect of assimilating Fregean and Tractarian objects 
beckons in the following way.  First, one will propose that Wittgenstein is working with a system of 
expression types comparable to that of Frege.  Next one will suggest that Tractarian objects are linked 
in reference to a Tractarian expression type comparable to Frege’s proper name.  And finally one will 
claim that Tractarian expressions of types other than that comparable to Frege’s proper name do not 
refer.  It is not, one will find the Tractatus to assert, the business of concept expressions to refer: there 
are no such things as concepts.  Reference is the business only of proper names. 
 Passages can be found in the Tractatus and elsewhere to support a proposal of this kind.  First 
one will read Tractatus 3.203 and 3.221 (“A name refers to an object” and “Objects can … be named”) 
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 as indicating that Tractarian names constitute the Tractarian expression type to be compared to the 
Fregean proper name.  Subsequently one may turn to Tractatus 3.1432: 
 
Instead of, ‘The complex sign “aRb” says that a stands to b in the relation R’, we ought to 
put, ‘That “a” stands to “b” in a certain relation says that aRb.’  (Wittgenstein (1961, 
3.1432)) 
 
To assert that the complex sign ‘aRb’ says that a stands to b in the relation R is, Wittgenstein claims, 
misleading.  Rather we should say: that ‘a’ stands to ‘b’ in a certain relation says that aRb.  A 
difference Wittgenstein is concerned to have us note between these two readings, one might then 
propose, is the intimation by the former but not the latter that there is a relation R to which the 
expression ‘R’ in ‘aRb’ refers.   
Tractatus 3.1432 is drawn directly from the 1913 Notes on Logic1 in which Wittgenstein also 
wrote: 
 
In “aRb” “R” looks like a substantive but it is not one.  What symbolises in “aRb” is that 
“R” occurs between “a” and “b”.  Hence “R” is not the indefinable in “aRb”.  Similarly in 
“φx”, “φ” looks like a substantive but is not one.  (Wittgenstein (1979, 98)) 
 
Rather: 
 
What symbolises in φξ is that φ stands to the left of a proper name.  (Wittgenstein (1979, 
116) 
 
The idea of these passages, as one might find it, would be first that Frege has slightly misidentified 
concept expressions and second that he has mistaken their semantic role.  Where Frege would say that 
the symbolising elements of ‘aRb’ are ‘a’, ‘b’ and ‘( )R( )’ and that the last of these refers to a concept, 
Wittgenstein claims that the symbolising elements are ‘a’, ‘b’ and that ‘R’ occurs between two names, 
and further that the last of these does not refer at all but has the role instead of effecting an assertion of 
a certain kind. 
 Given that Wittgenstein’s most immediate interlocutor in 1913 is not Frege but Russell, one 
may prefer to frame the proposal in current view in Russellian terms.  Tractarian objects, one will 
suggest, are Russellian particulars; there are no such things as Russellian universals.  Adopting this 
position, Thomas Ricketts has for instance written: 
 
Russell takes relations to be a type of thing – they are constituents of facts, objects of 
acquaintance, and the designata of names … .  All this is what the reality of relations comes 
to for him.  So conceived, Wittgenstein rejects the reality of relations, Russell’s most 
cherished ontological thesis.  Relations are not things, are not entities; relations cannot be 
labelled or designated.  Unlike “a” and “b,” “R” is not a symbol in “aRb.”  Instead, roughly 
put, the holding of a relation over objects is symbolized by the holding of a relation over 
names of those objects.  (Ricketts (1996, 72)) 
 
Nicholas Griffin agrees: 
 
In the Tractatus Wittgenstein speaks of elementary propositions as combinations of names, 
and states of affairs as combinations of objects, with no special explanation of what he 
means by ‘names’ or ‘objects’.  But unless there was a radical change in the way he himself 
used these words [between writing the Notes on Logic and writing the Tractatus], then by 
‘objects’ he must have meant particulars and so by ‘names’ names of particulars.  (Griffin 
(1964, 53)) 
 
Griffin proceeds explicitly to assert that Tractarian “[o]bjects are particulars” (Griffin (1964, 61)).  
Such exegetical claims have, however, been hotly disputed: 
 
Wittgenstein counts as ‘things’ not only individual objects but also predicates with different 
numbers of places.  (Stenius (1960, 63)) 
 
[T]he objects of the Tractatus included relations.  (Hacker (1989, 70)) 
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 There is virtually conclusive evidence that in the Tractatus Wittgenstein included 
properties, relations, and functions (in logicians’ usual sense, meaning certain kinds of 
relations) among his ‘objects’.  (Hintikka and Hintikka (1986, 32-33)) 
 
What, then, is this “virtually conclusive evidence”? 
 A first thing that might be adduced in favour of the position that Tractarian objects include 
properties and relations is an apparent tension between the position of Griffin and Ricketts and the 
assertion of Tractatus 2.01 that a state of affairs is a combination of objects (plural).  An elementary 
proposition ‘asserts the existence of a state of affairs’ (Tractatus 4.21).  If ‘φ’ in a subject-predicate 
proposition ‘φa’ is not a name, then it would seem that the state of affairs whose existence the 
proposition asserts could involve only one object, a.  Further support for the suggestion that objects 
include relations may then be gathered from certain passages in non-Tractarian texts.  In June 1915 
Wittgenstein wrote: 
 
Relations and properties, etc. are objects too.  (Wittgenstein (1979, 61)) 
 
And Wittgenstein was recorded in 1930 or 1931 by Desmond Lee as offering the following explanation 
of Tractatus 2.01: 
 
2.01.  “An atomic fact is a combination of objects (entities, things)”.  Objects etc. is here 
used for such things as a colour, a point in visual space etc.  …  “Objects” also include 
relations: a proposition is not two things connected by a relation.  “Thing” and “relation” 
are on the same level.  (Wittgenstein (1980, 120)) 
 
 Running then with the idea that Tractarian objects do indeed include relations, one will look to 
offer an understanding of the functioning of the proposition ‘aRb’ consonant, or at least consistent, 
with Tractatus 3.1432.  A suggestion one might make here is that Wittgenstein’s idea, as it develops 
into the Tractatus, becomes that there are three names in the proposition ‘aRb’, but that these are not 
‘a’, ‘R’ and ‘b’: rather they are ‘a’, ‘b’ and the relation of being on either side of the letter ‘R’.  As ‘a’ 
and ‘b’ name the objects a and b, so the relation of being on either side of the letter ‘R’ names a certain 
relation.  Thus Stenius has written: 
 
[T]here are two kinds of names: 
(a)  names of individual objects, which themselves belong to the category of individual 
objects, 
(b)  names of predicates, which themselves belong to the category of predicates and must 
have as many places as their denominate. 
According to this definition the names appearing in [the sentence ‘mSe’] are ‘m’, ‘e’ and 
the ‘S’-relation [that is, the relation which holds between two objects when the first is to the 
left and the second to the right of the letter ‘S’].  (Stenius (1960, 136)) 
 
And Hintikka and Hintikka write: 
 
Here what a name is, for Wittgenstein, is not a linguistic symbol (e.g., the letter ‘R’), but a 
linguistic relation (i.e. that of flanking a particular letter).  (Hintikka and Hintikka (1986, 
38)) 
…  
Part of the difficulty of accepting the interpretation offered here is terminological.  A name 
certainly seems to be always a word, not a linguistic property or linguistic relation.  
Furthermore, Frege sets up a contrast between saturated entities, which he calls objects, and 
unsaturated entities, which he terms functions.  On the interpretation presented here, 
Wittgenstein departs sharply from Frege’s terminology in this respect, for according to this 
interpretation Wittgenstein in the Tractatus calls both kinds of entities objects.  (Hintikka 
and Hintikka (1986, 39)) 
 
 It can thus be agreed by both sides in this debate over the objecthood of relations/functions 
that the proposition ‘aRb’ consists in the fact that an ‘R’ is flanked to the left by an ‘a’ and to the right 
by a ‘b’.  Where the two sides will disagree, however, is on what names are involved in this fact.  For 
Griffin and Ricketts the proposition’s two names are ‘a’ and ‘b’, and that these two names are 
combined in a certain way, namely that they stand on the left and right hand side respectively of an ‘R’, 
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 is what says that aRb.  For Stenius and Hintikka and Hintikka the names of the proposition ‘aRb’ are 
‘a’, ‘b’, and the relation of standing to the left and right of an ‘R’, and what says that aRb is that these 
three names are combined together in a certain way – in that way, that is, in which a relation and two 
particulars are combined when the relation holds in a certain direction between the two particulars. 
 Such, then, are the terms of a debate regarding the logical categorical status of Tractarian 
objects.  I shall not explore this disagreement any further.  Nor do I want to offer an adjudication 
between the two sides: it will be a conclusion of this paper that the debate is misguided.  Rather, let’s 
return afresh to the question of how to place Tractarian objects with the Fregean and Russellian logical 
varieties.  But instead of jumping in as we did before with a positive proposal, let’s begin instead by 
enquiring after the idea Frege and Russell present of a logical variety.  
 
 
2. 
 
Russell’s logical categories of particular, predicate and relation take their primary rise from his theory 
of atomic complexes.  In brief, this theory runs as follows.  A complex has constituents.  These 
compose the complex and are said variously to figure, occur, appear or enter in the complex.  Further – 
and here is the theory’s core – entities figure (occur etc.) in complexes different ways.  An entity, 
Russell holds, may appear in a complex either as a term or as a relating relation, and these appearances 
follow the pattern that in any (atomic) complex one entity appears as a relating relation and all the 
others as terms.  From this, Russell then derives his notions of a term and an n-ary relation.  A term is 
an entity which may appear in a complex as a term; an n-ary relation is an entity which may appear as a 
relating relation in a complex in which n entities appear as terms.  A unary relation we call a predicate; 
relations of all orders we call universals; terms which are not universals we call particulars.  So in 1913 
Russell wrote: 
 
In any complex, there are at least two kinds of constituents, namely the terms 
related, and the relation which unites them.  … In (say) “A precedes B”, A and B 
occur differently from the way in which “precedes” occurs. … An entity which can 
occur in a complex as “precedes” occurs in “A precedes B” will be called a 
relation.  When it does occur in this way in a complex, it will be called a “relating 
relation” in that complex. … 
Atomic complexes may be classified according to the number of terms other 
than the relating relation that they contain; we will call them dual complexes if 
they contain two terms, and so on.  Relations may be similarly classified: relations 
which can be relating in dual complexes will be called dual relations, and so on.  
 … 
It may be that there are complexes in which there is only one term and one 
predicate, where the predicate occurs as relations occur in other complexes.  In that 
case, predicates will be defined as entities occurring in this manner in complexes 
containing only one other entity. … 
Relations and predicates together will be called “universals”.  (Russell (1984, 
80-81)) 
 
A particular is defined as an entity which can only enter into complexes as the 
subject of a predicate or as one of the terms of a relation, never as itself a predicate 
or a relation.  (Russell (1984, 55-56)) 
 
 Frege’s logical categories are also characterised essentially by their combinatorial powers.  
The notion of combination in play with Frege is rather different from that in play with Russell: in place 
of entities combining as parts to make complex wholes, Frege’s theory at the level of reference is of 
entities combining as function and argument to deliver a value.  Very roughly, the theory is that a 
Fregean object is a possible argument of a Fregean first order function, and a Fregean function of order 
n is a possible argument of a Fregean function of order n+1.  [CHANGE THIS: NOT ‘POSSIBLE 
ARGUMENT’ BUT SIMPLY ‘ARGUMENT’] More, Fregean functions may have multiple argument 
places, and this introduces distinct logical categories: a second order function may not take in the same 
argument place both a first order function of one argument and a first order function of two arguments.  
A function may also have argument places of different levels and this likewise makes for distinct 
categories. 
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  The details of the Fregean and Russellian systems are not our current concern.  Nor shall I 
explore or compare the divergent ideas of combination employed by Russell and Frege.  The point to 
note here is rather that Frege and Russell are both involved in systems of entity combination, and that 
the logical categories of entity which they advance are characterised essentially by their roles in the 
combinatorial system.  Characterising each Fregean or Russellian logical category is a unique set of 
combinatorial powers, each such power being specified in terms of the logical categories only. 
 Now we noted above that there are in the Tractatus no classes of entity contrasting to the 
objects.  It might therefore seem that Wittgenstein does not have the resources to provide a 
combinatorial system on the Fregean or Russellian model.  To think this, though, is to think of 
Tractarian objects as constituting a single logical kind.  We have seen one way of doing this, namely by 
tying the notion of an object to a single expression kind.  But we have also seen that such a tie need not 
be made and that if it is not, space is available for divisions of logical type amongst the objects.  (We 
have seen the suggestion made, for instance, that Tractarian objects divide into particulars, properties 
and relations.)  As Wittgenstein uses them, one might propose, ‘object’ is a catch-all word meaning 
‘entity of reference’, and ‘name’ a catch-all word meaning ‘referring expression’.  The possibility will 
then be open of dividing up the objects into logical categories characterised by their combinatorial 
powers. 
 Wittgenstein introduces his notion of an object as follows: 
 
A state of affairs is a combination of objects (entities, things).  (Wittgenstein (1961, 2.01)) 
 
He continues: 
 
It is essential to things that they should be possible constituents of states of affairs. 
In logic nothing is accidental: if a thing can occur in a state of affairs, the possibility of the 
state of affairs must be written into the thing itself.  (Wittgenstein (1961, 2.011-2.012)) 
 
The possibility of its occurring in states of affairs is the form of an object.  (Wittgenstein 
(1961, 2.0141)) 
 
If two objects have the same logical form, the only distinction between them, apart from 
their external properties, is that they are different.  (Wittgenstein (1961, 2.0233)) 
 
Objects combine to form states of affairs.  The possibilities an object has for such combination are 
internal to it and constitute its logical form. 
 A Tractarian object has an internal, logical nature which is its powers to combine with other 
objects to form states of affairs.  This would seem to place Wittgenstein firmly in the company of Frege 
and Russell and their combinatorial varieties.  As Frege and Russell present a variety of logical 
categories of entity of reference, each category characterised by its combinatorial powers (whether that 
be function-argument or part-whole combination), so Wittgenstein envisages a variety of logical forms 
of entity of reference, these forms being a matter of combinabilities to form states of affairs.  Accepting 
this comparison, however, something that stands out in the above sections from the Tractatus is that 
Wittgenstein does there no more than envisage a logical variety.  Wittgenstein’s presentation at this 
point is made in the abstract: he does not specify what the various forms of object might be.  For Frege, 
Fregean objects and the variety of types of Fregean function constitute the available forms of entity; for 
Russell the forms of entity are particulars, properties and relations of the various orders.  But what 
forms does the Tractarian Wittgenstein imagine there to be? 
 
 
3. 
 
Let’s recall the link made by Frege between his variety of entities of reference and his variety of 
referring expressions.  What a Fregean proper name refers to is an object; what a Fregean function 
expression of a certain kind refers to is a function of that same kind.  It will be useful for us at this 
point to note that Wittgenstein is involved in a similar linking. 
 An elementary proposition, Wittgenstein asserts, consists of names; it is a combination of 
names (Tractatus 4.0311, 4.22).  And as objects are combinatorially discriminating, so too are the 
names.  Names may combine with each other in certain ways but not in others to form elementary 
propositions.  It is then a central plank of Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language that there is a match 
between these two systems of combinability, that of the objects and that of the names.  The 
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 combinatorial forms found within them are the same.  Further, an object of a certain form may be 
referred to only by a name of that same form.  What a name of a certain logical type refers to is an 
object of that same logical type. 
 This Tractarian theory is not brought up here to be explained or elucidated: the point is only to 
provide for a recasting of the question of what forms of Tractarian objects there are.  It is to allow for 
us to see that that question is equivalent, given certain central features of Wittgenstein’s philosophy of 
language, to the question of what forms of Tractarian names (that is, referring expressions) there are.  
And the answer to this latter question of what combinatorial types of names there are, we can further 
note, will be given by saying what types of combinations of names are possible.  That is, we will be 
told what forms of object Wittgenstein imagines there to be just in case we are told what his elementary 
propositional types (forms) are. 
 So what forms of elementary proposition does Wittgenstein take there to be?  Here one might 
hope to make recourse to a Wittgensteinian concept script.  The idea of a concept script is employed in 
various ways by Frege, Russell and Wittgenstein.  In one of the idea’s outlines, a concept script is a 
language whose surface syntax is logical syntax: it is a language whose propositions are such that we 
may identify their surface syntactic elements with their logical elements.  To see what propositional 
forms Frege, Russell and Wittgenstein hold there to be we thus need only look at the (surface) syntax 
of their concept scripts.  With Frege and Russell this tactic is immediately rewarding: on looking at 
Russell’s concept script, for example, we find there encoded his subject-predicate, dual relational, triple 
relational etc. forms.  With Wittgenstein, by contrast, we struggle.  Whilst we find on thumbing 
through the Tractatus an endorsement of the general idea of a concept script (Tractatus 3.325), we 
nowhere come across any particular such construction.  Wittgenstein, it might disappointingly seem, is 
keeping his elementary propositional form cards tight up to his chest. 
 The suspicion that Wittgenstein is being cagey on this matter is not however borne out by the 
text.  On the contrary, Wittgenstein directly poses himself the challenge: 
 
We now have to answer a priori the question about all the possible forms of elementary 
propositions.  (Wittgenstein (1961, 5.55)) 
 
This challenge is not subsequently ducked by Wittgenstein: rather he rejects it as misplaced: 
 
The application of logic decides what elementary propositions there are. 
What belongs to its application, logic cannot anticipate. 
It is clear that logic must not clash with its application. 
Therefore logic and its application must not overlap. 
If I cannot say a priori what elementary propositions there are, then the attempt to do so must 
lead to obvious nonsense.  (Wittgenstein (1961, 5.557-5.5571)) 
 
There is no saying a priori what forms of elementary propositions there are, and so no saying a priori 
what types (forms) of names, and so again of objects there are.  A demand for an exposition of the 
logical categories of entity, insofar as that is a request for something to be given a priori, is misguided.   
But what notion of ‘a priori’ is Wittgenstein making use of here?  In play is an opposition 
between logic and its application: the application of logic decides what elementary propositions there 
are; logic cannot anticipate what belongs to its application, and so it cannot anticipate the elementary 
forms.  But what is meant by logic in this context?  And what by its application? 
 
 
4. 
 
It is a distinctive claim of the Tractatus that relations of logical entailment amongst propositions result 
from their truth functional structuring only.  More, Wittgenstein is concerned in his book to provide a 
general characterisation of such structuring and thus of logical entailment.  Indeed, the provision of just 
such a characterisation – the provision, that is, of the general form of the proposition – is a significant 
climax of the Tractatus. 
 A second and connected Tractarian doctrine is that of the possibility of analysis.  There is, 
Wittgenstein holds, a procedure applying to propositions of natural language whose achievement is the 
uncovering of truth functional structure.  A proposition of English or German may be analysed and the 
result of such an analysis will be a display of how that proposition is composed, truth functionally, out 
of other, truth functionally simpler propositions.  More, there is the possibility of a complete analysis in 
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 which it is uncovered how the analysed proposition is composed out of truth functionally simple 
propositions – out, that is, of elementary propositions which consist of names only.   
 Approaching Tractatus 5.557-5.5571 in the context of these aspects of Wittgenstein’s thought, 
a suggestion one might make is that logic, as Wittgenstein uses the word in 5.557, means truth 
functionality.  And by the application of logic, the suggestion will continue, Wittgenstein means here 
the performance of truth functional analysis.  To apply logic is to uncover what truth functional 
structure is had by a proposition. The proposal will thus be that Wittgenstein’s use of ‘a priori’ in these 
contexts means ‘in advance of the performance of analysis’, and the assertion that the application of 
logic decides what forms of elementary propositions there are will be the assertion that the elementary 
forms become discernable only through analysis.  Whilst the notion of truth functionality is given a 
priori, the elementary forms will in this sense be available only a posteriori. 
 In Some Remarks on Logical Form2 Wittgenstein writes: 
 
If we try to analyze any given propositions we shall find in general that they are logical 
sums, products or other truth functions of simpler propositions.  But our analysis, if carried 
far enough, must come to the point where it reaches propositional forms which are not 
themselves composed of simpler propositional forms.  We must eventually reach the 
ultimate connection of the terms, the immediate connection which cannot be broken without 
destroying the propositional form as such.  The propositions which represent this ultimate 
connexion of terms I call, after B. Russell, atomic propositions.  … It is the task of the 
theory of knowledge to find them and to understand their construction out of the words or 
symbols.  This task is very difficult, and Philosophy has hardly yet begun to tackle it at 
some points.  (Wittgenstein (1993, 29)) 
 
If we analyse propositions we find that they are truth functions of simpler propositions.  Pursuing this 
far enough, we will eventually arrive at truth-functionally simple elementary propositions.  To do this, 
to find the elementary propositions and understand their construction is the task of Philosophy.  ‘The 
idea’ here, Wittgenstein continues: 
 
is to express in an appropriate symbolism what in ordinary language leads to endless 
misunderstandings.  That is to say, where ordinary language disguises logical structure, 
where it allows the formation of pseudopropositions, where it uses one term in an infinity of 
different meanings, we must replace it by a symbolism which gives a clear picture of the 
logical structure, excludes pseudopropositions, and uses its terms unambiguously.  
(Wittgenstein (1993, 29-30)) 
 
Our ambition in analysis is to rewrite propositions of ordinary language in a symbolism which gives a 
clear picture of their logical structure: a clear picture, that is, of which truth functions they are of which 
elementary propositions. 
 If we were to focus on this idea of rewriting in a concept script and lose sight of 
Wittgenstein’s earlier assertion that it is a task of analysis to find the elementary propositions and 
understand their construction, one might suppose that the development of a concept script would be a 
precursor to analysis.  Analysis, one might suppose, consists in translating propositions of ordinary 
language into a previously developed concept symbolism.  Heading off this misunderstanding, 
Wittgenstein continues: 
  
Now we can only substitute a clear symbolism for the unprecise one by inspecting the 
phenomena which we want to describe, thus trying to understand their logical multiplicity.  
(Wittgenstein (1993, 30)) 
 
And in a 1929 discussion with Waismann entitled ‘Objects’ Wittgenstein says: 
 
Only when we analyse phenomena logically shall we know what form elementary 
propositions have. (Wittgenstein (1979a, 42)) 
 
It is, Wittgenstein held, only through the performance of analysis that we may develop a clear 
symbolism, substituting it for the unprecise one of everyday.  A concept script will encode the 
elementary propositional forms and uncovering what these are is a principal ambition of the project of 
analysis. 
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 Wittgenstein is fundamentally opposed to the idea that one first constructs a concept script and 
only subsequently turns one’s attention to particular propositions of everyday, attempting to see how 
they might be written in the constructed symbolism.  One does not first work out what propositional 
forms there are and then subsequently decide which of these forms is had by some English sentence.  
Those are not the two steps of giving logic and applying it.  The two steps of giving logic and applying 
it are rather first to characterise truth functionality, and subsequently to uncover truth functional 
structuring within propositions.  And it is only through the second of these that the elementary forms 
will become apparent, that a concept-script will become available. 
 Wittgenstein finishes his line of thought in Some Remarks on Logical Form as follows: 
 
One is often tempted to ask from an a priori standpoint: What, after all, can be the only 
forms of atomic propositions, and to answer, e.g., subject-predicate and the relational 
propositions with two or more terms further, perhaps, propositions relating predicates and 
relations to one another, and so on.  But this, I believe, is mere playing with words.  An 
atomic form cannot be foreseen.  And it would be surprising if the actual phenomena had 
nothing more to teach us about their structure.  To such conjectures about the structure of 
atomic propositions, we are led by our ordinary language, which uses the subject-predicate 
and the relational form.  But in this our language is misleading.  (Wittgenstein (1993, 30)) 
 
The same point is made in the discussion with Waismann: 
  
Now I think that there is one principle governing the whole domain of elementary 
propositions, and this principle states that one cannot foresee the form of elementary 
propositions.  It is just ridiculous to think that we could make do with the ordinary structure 
of our everyday language, with subject-predicate, with dual relations, and so forth.  
(Wittgenstein (1979a, 42)) 
 
At Tractatus 5.5571 Wittgenstein declares the attempt to say a priori what the elementary forms are 
(what the elementary forms must be) certain to lead to nonsense; in Some Remarks on Logical Form he 
calls it “mere playing with words”.  We may be led by the use in our ordinary language of certain 
surface grammatical forms (e.g. the English or German subject-predicate form) into thinking that we 
can lay down the possible logical forms of propositions in advance of analysis, but it would be a 
mistake so to think – “in this our language is misleading”.  For Wittgenstein, Frege and Russell were 
misled in just this way when they constructed their concept scripts. 
 
 
5. 
 
As Frege and Russell, the Tractarian Wittgenstein envisages a variety of logical types of entity of 
reference.  However, where Frege and Russell lay out their logical varieties in a certain sense a priori, 
Wittgenstein thinks that such expositions are mistaken.  What forms of elementary proposition there 
are, Wittgenstein insists, will become available to us only through the pursuit of analysis.  What forms 
of name and so what forms of entity there are will in this sense be apparent only a posteriori.  Of 
course, the Tractatus does not itself engage in analysis – this is something for philosophers to do after 
the book has been read.  The Tractarian Wittgenstein is thus self-consciously agnostic with regard to 
the logical types of entity.   
 It is worth repeating the passage we have taken to this conclusion.  In section two I 
characterised the Fregean and Russellian notions of an entity’s logical type as pertaining essentially to 
basic combinatorial powers.  Wittgenstein, I then suggested, also operates with such a notion: entities 
have ‘logical forms’ characterised by their powers to combine to form states of affairs.  Frege and 
Russell do not, however, merely present an idea of a combinatorial type: they add flesh to the skeleton 
and lay down what they consider the combinatorial types (forms) actually to be.  Frege offers his 
combinatorial variety of Fregean objects and the various kinds of Fregean function, and Russell his of 
particulars and the various kinds of universal.  What flesh, we were left asking at the end of section 
two, does Wittgenstein give to his bones: what logical forms of entity does Wittgenstein imagine there 
to be?  Section three then took this question forward, recasting it first as the question what logical 
forms of name Wittgenstein imagines there to be, and subsequently as the question what logical forms 
of elementary proposition Wittgenstein imagines there to be.  Elementary propositions are 
combinations of names, and names share a combinatorial form with the objects to which they refer.  
We will thus be told what forms of object Wittgenstein imagines there to be just in case we have been 
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 told what types of name-combinations (that is, elementary propositions) he envisages.  At end of 
section three, however, we noted Wittgenstein’s declaration that the question of the elementary 
propositional forms (and hence of the forms of objects) cannot be answered ‘a priori’.  The subsequent 
task of section four was to explain what Wittgenstein intended in this context by ‘a priori’.  ‘A priori’ 
means here, I argued, ‘in advance of the performance of analysis’.  It is only through the performance 
of analysis that the elementary forms will become available.  It is only through the performance of 
analysis that we can find out what the logical types of entity are. 
 Looking back at the debate discussed above in section one of this paper, we will find it 
misconceived. To argue whether Wittgenstein intended us to take Tractarian objects to be particulars, 
or to include relations, is a mistake.  The Tractarian Wittgenstein does not think that any such would-be 
logical category terms as ‘particular’ or ‘relation’ have a priori application.  A suggestion made in 
advance of the pursuit of truth-functional analysis that Tractarian objects include, or do not include, 
relations is something Wittgenstein would have seen as “mere playing with words”. 
That the debate reviewed section one is mistaken is not a novel proposal.  Anthony Kenny has 
for instance written: 
 
Students of the Tractatus disagree whether that work is to be taken in a nominalist or 
Platonist sense: whether, that is to say, the objects which form the fixed substance of the 
world are to be interpreted as individuals or as universals.  The Notebooks that precede the 
Tractatus show that Wittgenstein himself veered between the nominalist and Platonist 
positions, and provide to that extent support for the rival interpretations of the Tractatus.  
However, it seems to me no accident that it is difficult to decide the question from the study 
of the Tractatus alone; when writing the book Wittgenstein chose his words carefully so as 
not to adopt either of the positions about which the Notebooks express his doubts and 
hesitations.  (Kenny (1984, 16)) 
 
David Pears agrees: 
 
It is possible that the Tractatus does not contain a definite answer to the question, whether 
all objects are particulars.   (Pears (1987, 137)) 
There are important sources of evidence not only in his preparatory work for the book, but 
also in his later comments on it, many of which imply that he had at least allowed for the 
possibility of counting relations and properties as objects.  But in the book itself he seems to 
be more non-committal than in his preparatory work for it, and, therefore, almost certainly 
deliberately non-committal.  (Pears (1987, 139)) 
 
Pears and Kenny correctly maintain that Wittgenstein offered no answer to the question of nominalism 
versus Platonism.  Their suggestion seems to be, however, that Wittgenstein withheld judgment on the 
matter, that whilst Wittgenstein found nothing wrong with the question it was nonetheless not his 
concern in the Tractatus to adjudicate which of the two answers is correct.  This exegetical position, 
whilst rejecting the propriety of debating whether the Tractarian Wittgenstein was a nominalist, 
remains quite different from mine.  The Tractarian Wittgenstein does not merely avoid giving an 
answer to the question whether objects include universals: he rejects the terms of the question.  Thus he 
says in the discussion with Waismann: 
 
When Frege and Russell spoke of objects they always had in mind things that are, in 
language, represented by nouns. … [Their] whole conception of objects is hence very 
closely connected with the subject-predicate form of propositions.  It is clear that where 
there is no subject-predicate form it is also impossible to speak of objects in this sense. 
(Wittgenstein (1979a, 41)) 
 
Our ignorance of the structure of elementary propositions means that we can make nothing of a would-
be logical category term such as Frege’s term ‘object’.  “Here”, as Wittgenstein sees it, “is an area 
where there is no hypothesis” (Wittgenstein (1979a, 42)). 
The philosopher I would like rather to enlist in support of the claims of this paper is Frank 
Ramsey.  Ramsey, we can quickly note, occupies a privileged exegetical position.  In September 1923 
he paid a visit to Wittgenstein in Puchberg where, over the course of a fortnight, Wittgenstein spent 
five hours a day going through the Tractatus with him line by line.3  It was important to Wittgenstein 
that someone understand him, and Ramsey – the outstanding logician-philosopher of the 1920s – was 
best equipped for that purpose.  More visits were subsequently made to Austria and a philosophical 
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 correspondence was maintained.  Turning to what Ramsey had to say, the key piece with regard to our 
current concern is the 1925 paper Universals whose stated purpose is “to consider whether there is a 
fundamental division of objects into two classes, particulars and universals” (Ramsey (1990, 8)).  
According to Russell, Ramsey writes, “terms are divided into individuals or particulars, qualities and 
relations, qualities and relations being grouped together as universals” (Ramsey (1990, 9)).  Appealing 
at several points to the ideas of Wittgenstein, Ramsey argues at length against this position, concluding 
that an unbiased logician will not be concerned to make any distinction between different types of 
things.   
In response to this rejection of his theory, Ramsey then imagines Russell as countering that: 
 
all atomic propositions are of the forms R1(x), R2(x,y), R3(x,y,z), etc., and so [the logician] 
can define individuals as terms which can occur in propositions with any number of terms; 
whereas of course an n-termed relation could only occur in a proposition with n+1 terms.  
(Ramsey (1990, 29)) 
 
To this Ramsey replies: 
 
But this assumes [Russell’s] theory as to the constitution of atomic facts, that each must 
contain a term of a special kind, called a universal; a theory we found to be utterly 
groundless.  The truth is that we know and can know nothing whatever about the forms of 
atomic propositions; we do not know whether some or all objects can occur in more than 
one form of atomic proposition; and there is obviously no way of deciding any such 
question.  We cannot even tell that there are not atomic facts consisting of two terms of the 
same type.  (Ramsey 1990, 29)) 
 
The failure to recognise this, Ramsey finally suggests, is the root cause of the “great muddle” which is 
the theory of universals: 
 
Of all philosophers Wittgenstein alone has seen through this muddle and declared that about 
the forms of atomic propositions we can know nothing whatever.  (Ramsey (1990, 30)) 
 
This is, I think, an overstatement of the case.  Wittgenstein asserts that we can know nothing a priori 
about the forms of atomic propositions, that the unbiased logician will not be concerned to make any a 
priori distinction between different types of things.  This leaves open the possibility of a posteriori 
knowledge of atomic forms.  Indeed, Wittgenstein’s Tractarian claim that what elementary propositions 
there are is decided by the application of logic (Tractatus 5.557), and his 1929 claim that “[o]nly when 
we analyse phenomena logically shall we know what form elementary propositions have” 
(Wittgenstein (1979a, 42)), would appear to endorse this possibility as genuine.  Ramsey’s strong claim 
here may nonetheless not be indefensible.  Whilst Wittgenstein holds every proposition to have a 
completed truth-functional analysis, the innumerability of logical forms (Tractatus 4.128) may be 
thought to entail the impossibility of human knowledge of such analyses.  One might ascribe to 
Wittgenstein the position that we will be able to construct improved symbolisms, gaining partial 
knowledge of logical forms, but will be unable to reach a symbolism offering full knowledge of logical 
forms.  I shall not here argue the point too vigorously: Ramsey is an ally in ascribing to Wittgenstein 
the thought that the historical theories of universals and particulars are ‘muddles’ predicated upon the 
false presumption that we have knowledge of atomic forms.  More, in a subsequent note to his paper 
Ramsey adjusts his position to my preferred interpretation: 
 
When I wrote my article I was sure that it was impossible to discover atomic propositions 
by actual analysis.  Of this I am now very doubtful, and I cannot therefore be sure that they 
may not be discovered to be all of one or other of a series of forms which can be expressed  
by R1(x), R2(x,y), R3(x,y,z), etc., in which case we could, as Mr Russell has suggested, 
define individuals as terms which can occur in propositions of any of these forms, 
universals as terms which can only occur in one form.  This I admit may be found to be the 
case, but as no one can as yet be certain what sort of atomic propositions there are, it cannot 
be positively asserted; and there are no strong presumptions in its favour, for I think that the 
argument of my article establishes that nothing of the sort can be known a priori. 
And this is a matter of some importance, for philosophers such as Mr Russell have 
thought that, although they did not know into what ultimate terms propositions are 
analysable, these terms must nevertheless be divisible into universals and particulars, 
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 categories which are used in philosophical investigations as if it were certain a priori that 
they would be applicable.  (Ramsey (1990, 31)) 
 
 
6. 
 
I want to close this paper first by tying up some loose ends presented by the passages deployed by the 
various parties in the debate of section one, and then finally by making a connection between the 
Tractarian insistence that logical form is available only a posteriori and a central aspect of 
Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. 
The key passages adduced in favour of attributing Platonism to Wittgenstein were 
Wittgenstein’s declaration on June 15 1916 that ‘Relations and properties, etc. are objects too’ 
(Wittgenstein (1979, 61)) and Desmond Lee’s record of Wittgenstein’s explanation in 1930 or 1931 
that Tractarian ‘“[o]bjects” also include relations’ (Wittgenstein (1980, 120)).  A first thing to note here 
is that it is not immediately obvious what significance to attach to these two passages.  The first was 
written at a time of experimentation and rapid development; the second is something of whose 
accuracy as a record of something Wittgenstein actually said we cannot be wholly confident.  Such 
doubts voiced, we may however readily find these passages to make assertions representative of the 
Tractarian position.  The reading would be that Wittgenstein is not with these remarks endorsing the 
Russellian categories and saying that he uses his term ‘object’ to denote an entity from any of these 
categories.  Roughly put, his point is rather that something is not to be excluded from Tractarian 
objecthood simply because Russell would have called it a universal.  Slightly more carefully made the 
point would be as follows.  Take a word you might at first glance think of as indicating a universal (a 
property or relation).  That that is a first way of thinking about it does not tend to show that it does not 
in fact refer.  It might well be a genuine name: there may well be such an entity as that which you 
might naively take the word to refer to.  (Of course, we will have to see how the proposition of which 
the word is a part is analysed in order to substantiate any such claim, and further, if it is substantiated, 
to clarify the logical nature of entity referred to).  In this highly attenuated sense, Wittgenstein does 
indeed come down in favour of Platonism. 
On the other side of the debate, Griffin and Ricketts both adduce remarks from Wittgenstein’s 
1913 writings – remarks identical or very similar to those noted in section one above – in support of 
their thesis that Tractarian objects are particulars.  My response to such appeals is not to deny that these 
1913 passages show Wittgenstein to have held something like the thesis that what are referred to are 
particulars, but simply to suggest that this idea was given up well before the drafting of the Tractatus.  
The Notes on Logic does not represent Wittgenstein’s mature position.  (On 19 June 1915 Wittgenstein 
wrote:  There doesn’t after all seem to be any setting up of a kind of logical inventory as I formerly 
imagined it (Wittgenstein (1979, 66)).) 
That Wittgenstein’s ideas changed significantly between 1913 and 1918 should, I think, be 
taken into account also when considering the other key passage at issue in the debate of section one, 
namely the discussion in Tractatus 3.1432 of the propositional sign ‘aRb’.  Tractatus 3.1432 sits in a 
passage running from section 3.14 through to 3.144 whose concern is to press – repeatedly – that ‘a 
propositional sign is a fact’ (Wittgenstein (1961, 3.14)) and so is neither a name nor a mere assemblage 
of names.  The purpose of section 3.1432 is to provide an illustration of this point.  The example it 
discusses, however, looks very much as if it is drawn from a Russellian concept script, and to the extent 
that it does it might appear to indicate a commitment of some kind to Russell’s logical categories.  
(This appearance holds, of course, whether you give the passage the reading recommended by the 
Platonist or the one recommended by the nominalist.)  Section 3.1432 is, we should however note, 
drawn directly from the Notes on Logic, and thus was penned at a time when Wittgenstein did indeed 
subscribe to something like a Russellian script.  By the time of the Tractatus this subscription has been 
cancelled and the ‘aRb’ example is, I would therefore suggest, an anachronism.  Wittgenstein’s 
continued use of it is, we should note, nonetheless not mysterious.  Outdated as it may be, the example 
has not been replaced.  There is no alternative Tractarian concept script from which to pick a 
propositional sign to use instead of ‘aRb’.  Wittgenstein’s 1913 example of a propositional sign is as 
good as any available to him in 1918 with which to press home his thesis that propositional signs are 
facts. 
 Nothing  I have said in this paper which goes very far by itself towards explaining why 
Wittgenstein held logical form to be discernable only in the performance of analysis.  This is a further 
question whose answering would be no small task.  Very quickly, however, I want finally to suggest 
that Wittgenstein’s Tractarian attitude towards the uncovering of logical form may be seen as an early 
version of his insistence that in order more clearly to see the workings of language ‘we must focus on 
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 the details of what goes on; must look at them from close to’  (Wittgenstein (1953, §51)).  To lay down 
the atomic forms a priori is precisely not to learn by looking at the details from close to.  It is to insist 
in advance that things must be a certain way and not to investigate how they in fact are.   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Wittgenstein 1979 p 106. 
2 Much of the material used in this section for understanding the Tractarian doctrine that elementary 
forms are available only through analysis comes from the year 1929.  By this time Wittgenstein had 
given up on the idea that elementary propositions are logically independent, and to that extent (at least) 
his idea of truth functional analysis was not unmodified.  It is unclear, however, that this development 
challenges any of the lessons I draw.  It is unfortunate that Wittgenstein chose not to discuss the project 
of analysis in any detail in the Tractatus itself. 
3 See Wittgenstein 1995 pp.186-187. 
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